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RESPONSE TO “SNYDER V. LOUISIANA: 
CONTINUING THE HISTORICAL TREND 
TOWARDS INCREASED SCRUTINY OF 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES” 
Bidish J. Sarma*† 
John P. Bringewatt’s recent note makes several important observations 
about the Supreme Court’s opinion in Snyder v. Louisiana.1 Although he 
provides reasonable support for the claim that Snyder represents a sea 
change in Batson jurisprudence, the US Supreme Court’s fresh opinion in 
Thaler v. Haynes2 (rendered on February 22, 2010) reads the Snyder major-
ity opinion narrowly and suggests the possibility that Snyder is not as potent 
as it should be. The Haynes per curiam’s guarded reading of Snyder signals 
the need for courts to continue to conduct the bird’s-eye cumulative analysis 
that the Court performed in Miller-El v. Dretke3 [hereinafter Miller-El II]. If 
lawyers challenging discriminatory peremptory strikes and trial courts repli-
cate Snyder’s single-juror approach but ignore concomitant Miller-El 
circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination, Snyder may (counter-
intuitively) sap Miller-El II of its on-the-ground transformative potential. In 
other words, lawyers should not rely too much on the “more individualized 
focus” observed and applauded by the author because a narrow framing of a 
Batson challenge in the Snyder opinion’s image (rather than a wider framing 
with a focus on the Miller-El factors) may fail in front of courts that view 
Snyder differently than does Bringewatt. A slightly different interpretation 
of the historical arc of the relevant cases and a critical reconsideration of 
Snyder’s circumstances foreshadow the outcome in Haynes and reveal nu-
ances that suggest problems with Bringewatt’s theory. 
Bringewatt correctly describes several landmark decisions in the Su-
preme Court’s jurisprudence on race discrimination in jury selection, 
including Strauder v. West Virginia,4 Swain v. Alabama,5 and Batson v. Ken-
tucky.6  However, his analysis is incomplete. While he persuasively 
                                                                                                                      
 * Bidish Sarma is a staff attorney at the Capital Appeals Project in New Orleans, Louisi-
ana. Allen Snyder is a client of the Capital Appeals Project. The views expressed by the author do 
not necessarily represent those of the Capital Appeals Project. 
 † Suggested citation: Bidish J. Sarma, Commentary, Response to “Snyder v. Louisiana: 
Continuing the Historical Trend Towards Increased Scrutiny of Peremptory Challenges,” 109 MICH. 
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 42 (2010), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/sarma.pdf. 
 1. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008). 
 2. Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171 (2010). 
 3. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). 
 4. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
 5. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
 6. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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demonstrates that the nature of the judicial inquiry into discrimination has 
changed over time, the historical trend has not always been “in favor of 
stronger Equal Protection considerations.”7  Rather than charting a neat tra-
jectory, the Court’s decisions reflect staggered progress in an on-and-off 
effort to eradicate race discrimination in jury selection. Bringewatt ac-
knowledges that “Hernandez and Purkett seem to disrupt [the] pattern,” but 
other cases litter the path as well.8  After Strauder, for example, other Su-
preme Court cases—including Neal v. Delaware9 and Bush v. Kentucky10— 
substantially undercut the progress. These cases presumed state compliance 
with the Fourteenth Amendment and ignored the history of discrimination 
that preceded the finding that racially exclusionary statutes were unconstitu-
tional. While it is true that the inquiry into discrimination in jury selection 
has evolved from a review of blanket statutory exclusions of minorities (in 
cases like Strauder) to case-specific intent-based assessments (required by 
Batson), the Court has not always made enforcement easier or the protection 
of the Fourteenth Amendment stronger. The history is a bit more erratic than 
Bringewatt presumes.  
This history is important because it shows that the Court has sometimes 
weakened rather than strengthened mechanisms originally designed to en-
force the constitutional mandate. In this context, the question is whether 
Snyder really makes it easier for courts to enforce Batson. Although 
Bringewatt argues Snyder was “an effort to create a more enforceable stan-
dard,” the more individualized focus may actually encumber litigants who 
allege that opposing counsel is purposely discriminating against prospective 
jurors on the basis of race.11  This perverse effect—that Snyder could work 
against those seeking to redress racial discrimination—arises from the 
Court’s framing of Snyder and its opinion in Haynes. 
Snyder could plausibly be read in either of two ways: as a strong holding 
that made “significant change[s] to the standard of review for Batson objec-
tions;” or, conversely, as a weak holding—a fact-specific anomaly to be 
distinguished away in the vast majority of Batson cases. As a matter of in-
terpretation, Bringewatt persuasively argues that a “remarkable paragraph  
. . . alters the Batson standard” because its “conclusion is at odds with the 
deference paid by the Court earlier in the opinion to trial judges’ unique 
capability to decide Batson issues.” The author is right: the Court’s conclu-
sion would be unsupportable if it truly provided the deference due under a 
traditional Batson analysis. If it deferred, the Court would not have stated 
that it “cannot presume that the trial court credited the prosecutor’s assertion 
that Mr. Brooks [the African American juror] was nervous.” Remarkably, 
                                                                                                                      
 7. John P. Bringewatt, Note, Snyder v. Louisiana: Continuing the Historical Trend Towards 
Increased Scrutiny of Peremptory Challenges, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1283 (2010) (emphasis add-
ed) [hereinafter ‘Increased Scrutiny’]. 
 8. Id. at 1294. 
 9. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880). 
 10. Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883). 
 11. Increased Scrutiny, supra note 7 at 1286. 
SARMA FI FINAL.DOC 11/3/2010 11:19 PM 
44 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 109:42 
 
the majority was unwilling to acknowledge the significance of this decision 
to not credit the claim that Mr. Brooks was nervous. Because Bringewatt 
notes that the Court did not “explicitly claim to create a new legal standard,” 
the weaker reading seems poised to prevail, even though it is analytically 
unconvincing.  
But there is good reason to attribute a strong holding to Snyder. On its 
face, the case is unprecedented: the Supreme Court overruled the judgments 
of a state trial court and supreme court to find a Batson violation where a 
single African American juror’s response to a single question sufficed to 
render him similarly situated to white jurors who gave similar responses. 
This was enough to support a finding of intentional discrimination.12 If Sny-
der means that a single point of agreement between a black juror and a 
white juror combined with a single instance of disparate treatment between 
those jurors is sufficient to require a Batson reversal on appeal, it is the most 
potent holding in the entire line of jury discrimination cases. 
The Snyder holding is paradoxical because the quality that conceivably 
makes it potent—that it turned on a single explanation that the Court found 
implausible—also makes it distinguishable, and possibly detrimental to 
those who seek to rectify racial discrimination in jury selection. Early in the 
opinion, the majority skirts the Miller-El cumulative analysis and positions 
itself as a one-juror case: “[b]ecause we find that the trial court committed 
clear error in overruling petitioner’s Batson objection with respect to Mr. 
Brooks, we have no need to consider petitioner’s claim regarding Ms. 
Scott.” The opinion also reaffirms the notion that trial court determinations 
deserve deference, but then disposes of the trial court’s ruling on the de-
meanor-based explanation for the strike against juror Brooks. By writing the 
opinion in this manner, the Court left open the possibility that lower courts 
could distinguish the case away—which is what Bringewatt indicates that 
most courts have done.13  The tension between Snyder’s potential force and 
its potentially limited application calls into question its precedential value. 
As a result, although the Snyder Court “ultimately applied a nondeferential 
standard of review,” it also effectively ensured that lower courts would not 
follow suit. 
On February 22, 2010, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Thaler v. 
Haynes that suggests how the highest Court itself views Snyder. Bringewatt 
accurately outlines the available options: 
It is possible that Snyder means that trial judges must explain the basis for 
their decisions on every Batson objection. It is also possible that such an 
explanation is only required if the reason proffered by the prosecutor in 
support of a peremptory challenge is not supported elsewhere in the re-
                                                                                                                      
 12. See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 483 (“The implausibility of this explanation is reinforced by the 
prosecutor's acceptance of white jurors who disclosed conflicting obligations that appear to have 
been at least as serious as Mr. Brooks'.”); id. at 483-85 (comparing juror Brooks’s response to those 
given by Roland Laws and John Donnes). 
 13. See Bringewatt, supra note 7 at 1305-06 (discussing Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Prather, 279 F. App’x 761 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); 
United States v. Reed, 277 F. App’x 357 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)). 
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cord. Finally, it is possible that the standard only applies under identical 
circumstances to Snyder, where one of the prosecutor’s explanations for a 
peremptory challenge is not accepted absent an explanation by the trial 
judge if another proffered explanation is found to be pretext for racially-
motivated challenges.14 
Haynes suggests that the Court will adopt the last view.  
Haynes was decided on federal habeas review. The Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opinion denying the 
defendant Batson relief “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable ap-
plication of, clearly established federal law.”15 Therefore, the question 
presented to the Supreme Court was limited to whether the relevant federal 
law under Batson and Snyder met the high standard of being “clearly estab-
lished.” 
Nonetheless, Haynes strongly hinted that the Supreme Court will read 
Snyder to be restrained, not revolutionary. First, the Court stated that Snyder 
does not demand that trial judges explain the basis for their rulings on every 
explanation offered by the striking party: “Batson plainly did not go further 
and hold that a demeanor-based explanation must be rejected if the judge 
did not observe or cannot recall the juror’s demeanor. Nor did we establish 
such a rule in Snyder.” The Court then elaborated:  
The part of Snyder on which the Court of Appeals relied concerned a very 
different problem. The prosecutor in that case asserted that he had exer-
cised a peremptory challenge for two reasons, one of which was based on 
demeanor (i.e., that the juror had appeared to be nervous), and the trial 
judge overruled the Batson objection without explanation. We concluded 
that the record refuted the explanation that was not based on demeanor 
and, in light of the particular circumstances of the case, we held that the 
peremptory challenge could not be sustained on the demeanor-based 
ground, which might not have figured in the trial judge’s unexplained rul-
ing. Nothing in this analysis supports the blanket rule on which the 
decision below appears to rest.”16 
The Court’s language speaks for itself, and indicates that, in Bringe-
watt’s words, “the standard only applies under identical circumstances to 
Snyder.” 
Snyder’s procedural history and the change in the composition of the 
Court contextualize that opinion and may shed light on why the Court em-
braced a weak reading in Thaler v. Haynes. The Supreme Court remanded 
Snyder in light of Miller-El II in June of 2005. Miller-El II was a 6-3 deci-
sion, with Justice O’Connor in the majority and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
joining the dissent. When Snyder came back to the Supreme Court after the 
initial remand, Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts had replaced 
O’Connor and Rehnquist, respectively. Even if both Alito and Roberts had 
                                                                                                                      
 14. Id. at 1304. 
 15. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 
 16. Id. at 1174-75 (emphasis added). 
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preferred to deny Snyder relief, they would have been unable to impact the 
outcome, assuming that the five remaining justices from the Miller-El II 
majority would grant relief in any case. By joining the majority, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts seized the authority to assign the duty to write the opinion.17 He 
gave that responsibility to the Justice most likely to write a weak holding—
Justice Alito.18 These circumstances help account for the outcome in Hay-
nes. 
The Court’s opinion in Thaler v. Haynes chips away at the claim that 
Snyder made Batson more enforceable. It also exposes an important flaw in 
Bringewatt’s general theory that a more individualized Batson analysis will 
uniformly benefit those who oppose discrimination. Miller-El II helps illus-
trate the point that a too-individualized analysis can undermine Batson. In 
Miller-El II, the Court emphasized the need to consult “all relevant circum-
stances” of discrimination. Though it didn’t alter Batson’s framework, 
Miller-El II left no doubt about what had allowed racial discrimination in 
jury selection to continue in the decades since Batson: courts had been con-
ducting too narrow an inquiry. Where courts simply looked at the race 
neutrality of the striking party’s explanations and validated them, they failed 
to uncover the most significant and damning evidence of discrimination.19 
As the Court wrote, “Batson’s individualized focus came with a weakness 
of its own owing to its very emphasis on the particular reasons a prosecutor 
might give.” By expanding the review—looking at historical evidence, sta-
tistical evidence, other evidence of discrimination contained in the record, 
and the striking party’s treatment of similarly situated nonminority jurors—
Miller-El II actually moved the jurisprudence a step back from the individu-
alized assessment. In this sense, “increased scrutiny” does not necessarily 
entail a more individualized focus. Miller-El II called courts to increase the 
level of scrutiny, but that did not mean a mere analysis of one juror at a 
time. Instead, it meant considering voir dire as a whole, as well as all other 
relevant circumstances that illuminate the striking party’s intent. 
Thus, an important consequence of the Snyder’s single-juror approach is 
that lower courts may incorrectly read it to narrow the Batson analysis. If 
the judicial inquiry into discrimination in jury selection becomes too indi-
                                                                                                                      
 17. The Chief Justice has the pivotal power to assign the opinion when he sits in the major-
ity. See, e.g., Paul J. Wahlbeck, Symposium: The Chief Justice and the Institutional Judiciary: 
Strategy and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 154 U.  PA.  L.  REV. 1729, 1730 
(2006) (“The power to assign authorship of the Court’s opinion provides the Chief with the capacity 
to direct the Court’s policy-making agenda. This assignment power is unique among the Chief’s 
duties in its ability to shape the development of the law.”). 
 18. Justice Alito’s record as a judge on the Third Circuit indicated that he had not been re-
ceptive to defendants’ claims that the prosecution intentionally discriminated against minorities in 
jury selection.  See, e.g., Riley v. Taylor, 237 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2001), vacated and reh’g en banc 
granted, 237 F.3d 348 (3d Cir. 2001), rev’d, 277 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (the initial panel opinion by 
Alito denying relief on Batson claim was later reversed by en banc Third Circuit; Alito dissented 
from the en banc opinion); Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857 (3d Cir. 1994) (opinion by Alito revers-
ing a federal district court ruling that granted Batson relief). 
 19. Bringewatt acknowledges this problem when he notes that Purkett v. Elem required a 
“low standard for a prosecutor’s explanation.”  Bringewatt, supra note 7 at 1294. 
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vidualized, courts may overlook highly probative evidence of discrimina-
tion. Indeed, Snyder itself failed to even mention that the trial prosecutor 
compared the defendant to O.J. Simpson when delivering his argument to 
the all-white jury.20 Moreover, courts may fall victim to the bunk notion that 
every juror’s uniqueness means that a side-by-side analysis cannot illumi-
nate the striking party’s intent absent perfect symmetry between minority 
and nonminority jurors. The Court in Miller-El II noted that requiring “an 
exactly identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable.” If courts 
looked for perfect or near-perfect symmetry between jurors, they would gut 
Batson and ensure that discrimination would run rampant but remain unde-
tected. In short, a hyper-individualized focus could cultivate myopia in 
lower courts; litigants must beware, and should proffer as much circumstan-
tial and atmospheric evidence of racism as possible to bolster their claims of 
discrimination.  
Although Snyder certainly stands out as an important victory for oppo-
nents of race discrimination, its long-term effect cannot be foreseen. The 
Court’s narrow single-juror approach—which ignores circumstantial evi-
dence of discrimination—and its refusal to require trial courts to rule on 
each proffered race-neutral explanation to trigger appellate deference ob-
scure the signals sent. If relied upon, Snyder could trap unwary litigants who 
anticipate that lower courts or the Supreme Court will view the case as a 
robust pillar against race discrimination. There is no doubt that Bringewatt 
was right to state that “[t]he persistence of [race discrimination in jury selec-
tion] over time suggests that is has been difficult to find a lasting solution to 
the problem.” Snyder very well could be, and should be, a step in the right 
direction. Yet, history, context, and Haynes should give pause. Litigants 
must remember that Swain’s “net was not entirely consigned to history;” 
circumstantial evidence is critical.21  If courts (including the Supreme Court) 
continue to distinguish and minimize Snyder, opponents of discrimination 
who overlooked persuasive circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent 
will curse their misfortune, and regret misreading Batson’s tea leaves. 
                                                                                                                      
 20. The Court’s failure to discuss the prosecutor’s O.J. Simpson references at trial led one 
commentator to criticize the opinion. See, e.g., Camille A. Nelson, Batson, O.J., and Snyder: Les-
sons from an Intersecting Trilogy, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1687, 1722 (2008) (“Oddly . . . the Court . . . 
failed to undertake the expansive contextual analysis to which it purportedly subscribes. This was a 
tremendous missed opportunity. It is remarkable that the Court in assessing the Batson challenges in 
Snyder did not even mention the O.J. Simpson case.”). The failure was especially notable given the 
amount of attention the O.J. Simpson references received during oral argument. See Posting of Lyle 
Denniston to SCOTUSblog, Commentary: Trial judges on trial?, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/12/commentary-trial-judges-on-trial/ (Dec. 4, 2007, 2:24pm) 
(“The case of Snyder v. Louisiana (06-10119) may live in history as a case about using O.J. Simp-
son’s legal troubles as a way to ‘play the race card’ before an all-white jury trying a black man. The 
Supreme Court, in a hearing on Tuesday, showed some fascination with that part of the case.”). 
 21. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 239 
